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- .eorge Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue would have
entered the public domain back in 1998 ' when its copyright
expired under the 1976 Copyright Act.' That same year,
however, Congress passed the Sonny Bono CopyrightTerm
Extension Act (CTEA), I which added 20 more years of
copyright protection for existing and future works 4 -and
prevented Rhapsody in Blue from becoming public property
until 2018.'
The CTEA makes United States copyright laws
consistent with that of the European Union, 6 just as the
1976 Copyright Act made them consistent with the mini-
mum copyright protections required by the Berne Conven-
tion, which the U.S. joined in 1988.1 However,whether the
CTEA is consistent with the U.S. Constitution is a matter
of debate. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the petitioners launched a
constitutional challenge to the CTEA under the Copyright
and First Amendment Clauses. They lost in both the dis-
trict and appeals courts.' The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari 9 and agreed to review two issues: (I) whether
Congress has the power under the Copyright Clause to
extend retroactively the term of existing copyrights, and (2)
whether extending the term of existing and future copy-
rights is "categorically immune" from challenge under the
First Amendment. " Because the outcome of this case has
far-reaching consequences, members of the academic, liter-
ary, art, and music communities have submitted numerous
amici curiae briefs to aid the Court in its decision."
This Note explores opposing arguments on the
constitutionality of the CTEA under the Copyright Clause,
which gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Prog-
ress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries" 2 Part I of this Note
analyzes whether Congress violated the "limited Times"
restriction by extending the terms of existing copyrights.
Part II examines whether the CTEA promotes the "Prog-
ress of Science' ' Finally, Part Ill highlights questions the
U.S. Supreme Court must resolve to maintain the balance
between the rights of the copyright holder and the inter-
ests of the public.
The "limited Times" requirement of the Copyright
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Clause prevents Congress from granting perpetual copy-
right terms. 11 While Congress has never enacted perma-
nent terms, it has extended them eleven times in the past
40 years. " Petitioners in Eldred argue that while each
extension has a fixed duration, the practice of expanding
copyright terms for an infinite number of times is in effect
an unlimited grant of copyrights. 6 Moreover, they assert
that there must be a limit to the number of years Congress
can extend a copyright term. 7 Otherwise, "[t]he Con-
gress that can extend the protection of an existing work
from 100 years to 120 years, can extend that protection
from 120 years to 140; and from 140 to 200; and from 200
to 300:' 8 Petitioners conclude that this creates uncer-
tainty about the expiration of copyright terms and that such
uncertainty should be enough for the Supreme Court to
conclude that Congress has exceeded its power in enacting
the CTEA.
In response, the Government points out that nine
of the eleven extensions in the past 40 years were in fact
roughly one- or two-year extensions between 1962 and
1974. 9 These extensions were enacted to prevent copy-
righted works from going into public domain while adop-
tion of the 1976 Copyright Act was pending. 20 In the
past 90 years, Congress has made only two ultimate exten-
sions to copyright terms: the first was the 1976 Copyright
Act and the second was the CTEA. 2' Furthermore, if the
Supreme Court holds the CTEA unconstitutional, it might
also have to hold the 183 I, 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts
unconstitutional as well. 22 To complicate matters, holding
the 1976 Copyright Act unconstitutional would put the
United States in violation of its treaty obligations under the
Berne Convention and result in potentially serious interna-
tional consequences.23
According to Petitioners, the goal of the Copyright
Clause is to "promote the Progress of Science" and the
means to achieve this goal is by giving Congress the power
to grant authors "exclusive Right[s]" for "limited Times" 24
The Progress of Science is promoted by the creation of
new writings. 2 Thus, Congress may grant authors monop-
olies that are limited in duration in exchange for writings.
26
Moreover, such writings must be original, 27 a requirement
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that the Supreme Court expounded in Feist Publications v.
Rural Telephone Service Co. 28 Petitioners argue that works
already in existence lack originality."9 Therefore, Congress'
grant of fixed term monopolies to existing works violates
the Copyright Clause because such a grant does not pro-
mote the Progress of Science.30
On the other hand, the Government argues that"Feiss
originality requirement determines only whether a work is eli-
gible for copyright protection; it has no relevance to the "lim-
ited Times" for which a work may be protected."'" The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, noting that "[o]riginality
is what made the work copyrightable in the first place"
32 Once a work has satisfied the originality requirement,
it need not satisfy it anew for its copyright to continue. "3
The Government also argues that application of the CTEA
to existing works promotes the Progress of Science by
increasing incentives for copyright owners to restore and
disseminate their works. 14 Many older works have been
fixed in perishable media. Advances in technology now
allow older works that would otherwise be lost forever to
be restored and distributed to the public.3" This promotes
progress because the public will be exposed "to expression
that might otherwise be lost or remain secret' 3"
Various amici curiae briefs argue that the CTEA
promotes the Progress of Science by stimulating the cre-
ation of new works because it provides capital for copy-
right holders to reinvest in the creation of new works as
well as funding for scholarships, grants, and awards that pro-
mote the creation of new works. "
While underlying copyright law is the notion that
an author is the owner of his original expression, the fram-
ers of the Constitution also recognized that information
must also be available to the public. Information is intan-
gible.38 Unlike cars or jewelry, it cannot be kept inside a
garage or locked in a safe. Because information is intan-
gible, it is also indivisible." It will never be depleted no
matter how many people use it.4" If people were charged a
fee to gain access to information, those who cannot or will
not pay this fee will be deprived of its benefits even though
sharing the information with them would not harm anyone
else. 4' Thus, it is beneficial to the public for information to
be free.
42
The problem, however, is that it usually takes time,
effort and money to generate information. Without com-
pensation, only a few people would be willing to engage
in extensive research, writing, or creative activity.43 Many
would prefer to free-ride on the few who choose to sweat
and toil. The challenge is to provide authors and inventors
incentives to generate information while making sure that
the public gains access to this information.
By its language, the Copyright clause attempts to
strike a balance between authors' rights to reap the ben-
efits of their work and the public's right to gain access to
it. The Supreme Court's role is to ensure this balance is
preserved, but the task is not an easy one. The Copyright
Clause's "limited Times" requirement prevents permanent
monopolies of copyrights, but it does not provide guidance
as to where the limit should be drawn. If, as Petitioners
argue, Congress has the ability to extend copyright terms
an infinite number of times, then that would be function-
ally equivalent to perpetual copyright terms. But to strike
down every copyright term extension from 1790 would
put the United States behind current international copy-
right laws. This would have devastating consequences. The
United States would lose its competitive edge in intellectual
property because the European Union and the members
of the Berne Convention provide greater copyright protec-
tions for their copyright holders. Moreover, if the United
States violates its treaty obligations, it may damage its inter-
national relationships with other countries.
Therefore, the line must be drawn somewhere in
between. The Petitioners have suggested that it should be
drawn between the 1976 Copyright Act and the CTEA.
However, they do not suggest a convincing rationale for
drawing the line there. They do not adequately explain why
the 1976 CopyrightAct is not unconstitutional and why the
CTEA is. In fact, they even entertain the possibility that
copyright term extensions after 1790 may be unconstitu-
tional. Thus, it is for the Supreme Court to set a standard
that prevents Congress from creating the functional equiva-
lent of perpetual copyrights but still gives it flexibility to
deal with the changes in this developing world.
The Supreme Court must also deal with the ques-
tion of whether the CTEA promotes the Progress of Sci-
ence in extending copyright in already existing works.
There are, of course, considerations of fairness, uniformity
and administrative ease. It would seem unfair to grant less
copyright protections to works based simply on the fact
that they were created before the extension of copyright
terms. It would also be difficult, not to mention confusing,
to keep track of when various works expire. This would
create a degree of uncertainty that Petitioners were trying
to avoid in the first place. There may be many ways to pro-
mote the Progress of Science, but the ultimate question is
whether they are consistent with the Copyright Clause.
The CTEA is another example of Congress' attempt
to balance the competing interests of copyright holders
and the public. While the Supreme Court usually defers to
Congress in the enactment of laws, it cannot do so when
those laws are inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. In
Eldred v.Ashcroft, the Supreme Court must do the balancing
act, and no matter how it decides on the issues before it,
there will always be interests that will win and interests that
will lose. Fortunately, interests shift, and those who appear
COPYRIGHT
to be losers now, may eventually be winners in the end.
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